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TORTS
Ralph Michael Stein*
While the last several years have witnessed significant change
in the field of tort law, viewed as advancement by some and regression by others, 1985 was a relatively stable year, a t least in the
courtroom. With a sometimes real, sometimes imagined, crisis in
the liability insurance field, the drive to change, reform, improve,
and re-package the law of civil wrongs has been in full swing. A
myriad of legislative proposals followed a continued public debate,
fueled by high pressure advertising campaigns, about the societal
cost of the common law tort system. Local governments threatened
to close parks and police departments; doctors issued their perennial warnings about the looming shortage of practitioners, all of
the good ones supposedly having flown away to low-litigation areas.
The enactment of some measures, whether reform or not, will affect tort practice in this state during the coming Survey year. The
changes wrought will be examined in next year's Survey.

A. Informed Consent
Physicians sued for malpractice frequently attempt to offset a
possible heavy jury award by seeking to establish the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. If successful, the defendant-physician
may reduce significantly the amount of damages awarded under
the New York comparative negligence statute.' The question
whether New York's pure comparative negligence statute applies
to causes of action based on lack of informed consenta mas dis* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author is a co-author
of CO~WARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE
(Matthew Bender 1984), and he frequently lectures on medical,
psychiatric, and nursing malpractice law.
1. See N.Y. CPLR 1411 (McKinney 1976)
2. N.Y.PUB.
HEALTH LAW3 2805-d(1) (hIcKinney 1985) provides:
Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person providing profmionnl
treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the
reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonnble medical pmcti-
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cussed in Bellier v. B a ~ a nIn
. ~Bellier, the plaintiff had undergone
a breast reduction procedure, essentially a cosmetic operation:
from which resulted, so the plaintiff claimed, "severe and unnecesThe plaintiff alleged both a failure
sary scarring and disc~mfort."~
to obtain informed consent and medical malpracti~e.~
The issue of
the plaintiffs comparative negligence was put to the jury solely on
the medical malpractice cause of action. The jury, however, responding on a verdict sheet, found the defendant to be liable on
both causes of action, and also found the plaintiff to be contributorily negligent.' The defendant's motion to set aside the medical
malpractice verdict was granted.8
The plaintiff moved to set aside the jury's finding that, on the
informed consent cause of action, she was responsible for fifteen
percent of the $356,000 of damage^.^ She contended that "comparative fault cannot be used as a defense in an action sounding in
lack of an informed consent,"1° and that, "even assuming that the
doctrine can be applied, no evidence in the instant case supports
it.7911
The trial court agreed that the defendant simply had failed to
meet his burden of presenting evidence of the plaintiffs contributory negligence with reference to the lack of informed consent.12 Of
greater interest, however, is the court's succinct disposition of the
plaintiffs claim that New York's comparative negligence concept is
inapplicable to informed consent actions. Noting that the informed
consent cause of action is "a form of medical malpractice,"13 the
court found that "[tlhe doctrine of mitigation of damages, available as a defense to other forms of medical malpractice, should,
therefore, properly apply to a cause of action for lack of informed

tioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting
the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.

Id.
3. 124 Misc. 2d 1055, 478 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1984).
4. See id. at 1056, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1055-56, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1056, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 563-64.
9. See id. at 1056, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 1058, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
13. Id. at 1056, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
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ons sent.^"^
What the law calls contributory negligence, physicians usually
call "patient non~ompliance."'~While specific defenses are provided for by New York's informed consent statute, contributory
negligence is not one of them.16 As the court noted in Bellier, however, proper analysis of New York law demonstrates that the doctrine is fully applicable.'? Factual analysis of lack of informed consent causes of action, especially when they are not accompanied by
allegations of medical malpractice, may indicate the potential usefulness of contributory negligence to diminish a plainWs
recovery.
The Appellate Division, First Department, decided a combined medical malpracticelfailure to obtain informed consent case
during the Survey year. In Suria v. Shiffman,'8 the plaintiff, a
transsexual, underwent a breast procedure which resulted in various unsightly and unpleasant after-effects. A surgical procedure
was recommended to alleviate the iatrogenic complications of
Suria's initial encounter with one of the defendant^.'^ More medical problems followed.20One of the defendants was found to have
committed malpractice whiie another was found to have failed in
his duty to obtain informed consent?' It is unfortunate that the
First Department did no more than mention that the latter defendant altered the informed consent form, after it had been executed, to reflect an acknowledgment by the patient that he was
consenting to a more extensive and invasive procedure.22 One won-

14. Id. In all probability, a claim by a defendant of contributory negligence in a medical
malpractice case will be most likely to succeed when the physicinn had provided enough
information so as to permit some exercise of reasonable decision-making by the patient The
level at which a patient can fail to exercise due care for hisher own life in nn informed
consent situation may be at a point below that at which a physician will be found to have
reasonably discharged the informed consent duty.
15. Patient non-compliance can include acts of both omission and commission. Each
type of failure to follow reasonable instructions can,of course, lead to n subtnntinl hnrm to
the patient.
16. See N.Y. PUB.HEALTH
LAW5 28054 (hlcKinney 1985).
17. See Bellier, 124 Misc 2d at 1058, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 564.
18. Suria v. S h i i a n , 107 kD.2d 309,486 N.Y.S.2d 724 ( k t Dep't 1985).
19. See id. at 310,486 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 311, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
22. See id. at 311, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 725. The consent form stated thnt the plnintiff
would only have a small scar on his chest. One of the defendants chnnged the form without
notifying the plaintiff. See id.
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ders if the patient, a transsexual, was treated with the professionalism and seriousness with which the defendants would have approached other patients. In any event, the appellate panel was
clearly correct in reducing the plaintiffs award to $800,000 from
the $2 million originally awarded.23 Such verdicts only serve to
continue to fan the "tort law reform" fires in this state.
B. Mental Distress
The nature of medical treatment, even the presence of nonpatients in a medical facility, creates recurring fact patterns in
which individuals who may not be patients themselves sustain
emotional harm in the absence of any actual physical injury or aggravation of an existing condition. New York has recently begun to
enlarge the concept of negligent infliction of mental distress and
plaintiffs are seeking to bring actions within the sheltering scope of
'
cases decided during the Survey year,
Bovsun v. S ~ n p e r i . ~Two
each involving institutional or individual health-sector defendants,
provide some insight into the direction of this developing area of
tort law.26
Of major importance is the Court of Appeals decision in John.~~
in last year's Survey artison v. Jamaica H o ~ p i t a l Mentioned
cle:' Johnson involved a tragic situation. The plaintiffs' newborn
infant was abducted from the defendant's hospital and was not
found by the police for over four months.28The plaintiffs' brought
an action for what they perceived as the defendant's negligent in23. See id. a t 314-15, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 727-28. Multi-million dollar medical malpractice
awards in cases where there is no death and no permanent vocation-disabling injuries are
almost always predicated on a jury's sympathy for the plaintiffs pain and suffering. Such
awards may also be, even if not so denominated, exemplary damage awards. Such awards,
when sustained, often constitute the basis for the major part of a plaintiff counsel's
renumeration. These awards are difficult to defend on any rational basis and a statutory
ceiling on pain and suffering awards in all tort actions will alleviate some of tho economic
problems which seem to feed the current liability crisis nationwide.
24. 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984) (where defendant nogligently creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, and such negligence is a substantial
factor of resulting physical injuries, the immediate family of the injured person, if within
the zone of danger, may recover damages under the theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress).
25. See Johnson v. Jamaica Hospital, 62 N.Y.2d 523,467 N.E.2d 502,478 N.Y.S.2d 838
(1984); Tebbutt v. Virostek, 102 A.D.2d 231, 477 N.Y.S.2d 776 (3d Dep't 1984).
26. 62 N.Y.2d 523, 467 N.E.2d 502,478 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1984).
L. REV.595, 620 (1985).
27. See Stein, Torts, 1984 Survey of N.Y.Law, 36 SYRACUSE
28. See Johnson, 62 N.Y.2d a t 525, 467 N.E.2d a t 502, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 838.
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fliction of mental distress.2BA motion to dismiss the complaint by
the defendant hospital was denied by the trial court.gOA divided
Second Department panel aflirmed Special Term and the case was
certified to the Court of Appeals.g1 For reasons which I find highly
unpersua~ive,3~
the State's highest court reversed, dismissing the
complaint.33
In an opinion authored by Judge Kaye, the Court noted that
the plaintiffs do not come under the recently announced Bovsun
rule34because the parents of the abducted girl "have not alleged
that they were within the zone of danger and that their injuries
resulted from contemporaneous observation of serious physical injury or death caused by defendant's negligen~e."~~
Citing the always-available prime duty case, Palsgraf u. Long
Island Railroad,s6 the Court of Appeals noted that if any duty was
breached, it was to the abducted infant and not to the parents.37
The Court's reasoning relied heavily on Kalina a General HospitaLs8 It is unfortunate that the analytical underpinning for the majority's analysis of duty is based on a case concerning a botched
c i r c u m c i ~ i o nhardly
~ ~ a parallel in kind or degree with kidnapping,
a crime that arouses universal revulsion and involves unquestioned
psychic trauma for parents.
The Court of Appeals also rejected predicating liability on ei-

29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text
33. See Johnson, 62 N.Y.2d a t 537-38, 467 N.E.2d a t 510,478 N.YS.2d nt 846.
34. See supra note 24.
35. Johnson, 62 N.Y.2d a t 526, 467 N.E.2d a t 503, 478 N.Y.S.2d nt 839. Judge Knye
continued:
Plaintiffs contend . . . that their complaint states a cause of action bemuse the
defendant hospital owed a duty directly to them, as parents, to care properly for
their child, and that it was or should have been forseeable to defendant thnt any
injury to Kawana, such as abduction, would cause them mental distress There is no
basis for establishing such a direct duty. This court has refused to recognize such a
duty on the part of a hospital to the parents of hospitalized children. nod there
is no reason to depart from that rule here.
Id. at 526-27,467 N.E.2d a t 503,478 N.Y.S.2d a t 839 (citing Kaling v. Geneml Hospital. 13
N.Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309, 245 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1963)).
36. 248 N.Y.2d 339, 162 N.E.2d 99 (1928).
37. See Johnson, 62 N.Y.2d a t 527,467 N.E.2d a t 503,478 N.YS.2d a t 839.
38: 13 N.Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309.245 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1963).
39. See id. .

..

-
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ther in loco parentis40 or contractual grounds41The Court's analysis of the in loco parentis argument is technically correct, but is
essentially tangential to the real issue: the predication of liability
based on a straight common law negligence, duty analysis.
Towards the end of the majority's opinion, an old rationale for
denying the existence of a cause of action slips past in a short but
familiar sentence: "In considering a new duty, the court's concern
for its ramifying consequences should hardly be di~paraged."~~
There it is, gentle reader, the judicial specter of a horde of suitors
rushing to claim their compensation for their abducted children
with the resultant clogging of the courts.
In his cogent dissent, Judge Meyer tackled the just-referred-to
shibboleth head-on. "I had thought that the fear of 'open-ended
liability for indirect emotional injury' . . had long ago been laid to
rest."43 Apparently not. Judge Meyer correctly noted that Bovsun
did not prevent recognizing the cause of action raised by the plaintiffs in Johnson:

.

In my view the parental weight to custody is sufficiently distinct
from physical injury to or death of a child, the class of persons
permitted to recover sufficiently limited, and the psychological
trauma to the parents resulting from infringement of their custodial rights is direct rather than consequential and sufficiently
probable in human experience that they should be permitted to
recover upon proof of a serious and verifiable emotional
disturbance."

With reference to the duty issue, Judge Meyer noted that,
"[tlhe policy determination to be made may be stated as whether
the interests of plaintiffs and defendant and the relationship between them are such that defendant rather than plaintiffs should
be required to bear the burden of plaintiffs' psychic injury."46
Judge Meyer examined the record and found that no undue burden would be placed on the defendant hospital if this cause of action was allowed because the exercise of reasonable care towards

40. The literal interpretation of in loco parentis is "in place of the parent."
41. See Johnson, 62 N.Y.2d at 528, 467 N.E.2d at 504, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 840-41.
42. Id. at 531, 467 N.E.2d at 506, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
43. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing Battala v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d
729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961)).
44. Id. at 533, 467 N.E.2d at 507, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 533, 467 N.E.2d at 507, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 844 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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the infant would also be the basis for fkding a breach of the
claimed duty asserted by the ~arents.'~
Although I f h d Judge Meyer's approach to the duty issue to
be analytically stronger than the majority's treatment of this pivotal concept, it is interesting that neither majority nor dissent
raised, let alone discussed, key public policy concerns. Any jurist
in this country today may, without criticism, take judicial notice of
the fact that the American public is somewhat preoccupied with
the real or imagined epidemic of missing children, a large number
of whom have been abducted criminally. The faces of missing children are found in public utility bills, on milk containers and posters that seem to be everywhere. That dealing with the phenomenon of missing children is a national priority is beyond dispute.
Part of the national awareness campaign concerning missing children has been the highlighting of the intense anguish of parents.
The social reality of the missing children issue is a model for advancing common law duty concepts to better deal with a newly recognized issue. Tort law has a prophylactic function in helping to
establish standards of reasonable behavior so as to prevent future
and additional harms. Imposing a duty upon a hospital to safeguard helpless babies from abductors with the duty running to the
parents who suffer, in some instances, such as Johnson, the only
measurable harm, will demonstrate the continued rational vitality
and relevance of the common law, while affording some measure of
compensation for great emotional distress.
In Tebbutt v. Viro~tek,'~the Third Department afbmed a
summary judgment dismissing a complaint predicated on emotional stress to a woman caused by the stillbirth of her fetus. The

46. See id. a t 534, 467 N.E.2d a t 508, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 844. Apparently the Johnson
baby, recovered by the police, was unharmed physically and hnd not been mistreated emotionally. A cause of action on behalf of the infant for actual physical or emotionnl injuries,
had they occurred, is well-grounded in New York law. If such an action rios brought a g h t
the hospital, it would be difficult for the hospital to seriously daim thnt they owed the baby
no duty to safeguard her from being feloniously spirited from the premises. The breach of
that duty, to be proven by the plaintiff, is exactly the same breach of care claimed by the
baby's parents in the instant case. Recognizing the plaintiffs' negligent infliction of mental
distress cause of action in this case would not have resulted in the imposition of n new and
socially unacceptable burden upon this or any other health facility. Even if one accepts the
prevailing majority concern of the Court of Appeals that causes of action for negligent inflicis itself a
tion of mental distress must be accepted slowly if a t all, the Johnson sce-o
readily "controlled" or encapsulated problem opening no new doors to futum litigants
47. 102 kD.2d 231,477 N.Y.S.2d 776 (3rd Dep't 1984).
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stillbirth was alleged to be a result of the negligence of the defend~ patient based her cause of action on Bovsun v.
ant d o ~ t o r . 'The
S ~ n p i e r i As
.~~
Justice Main noted, Tebbutt lacked the Bovsun requirements of either observation of harm inflicted, or a contemporaneous awareness of the situation.60
The court also noted that predicating liability upon the theory
of an injury done to the fetus was untenable under current New
York law.61 New York law holds that "a child en ventre sa mere is
not considered a person unless it sees the light of day."62 The appellate court concluded that "it is conceptually difficult to say that
plaintiffs emotional distress is incidental to the physical injury of
a third person, the unborn child who never saw the light of day."o8
Given the amount of litigation involving injury or death to fetuses,
it is likely that the issues raised in this case will be before the
Court of Appeals within the next few terms of court.
Several other cases decided during the Survey year concerning
medical malpractice are worth brief mention. Needham v. County
of Nassau5' concerned the appealability of an order denying a motion to vacate the findings of a medical malpractice panel.OThe
Second Department, relying on legislative intent, found that there
is no appeal as of right in such circ~mstances.~~
Two cases demonstrated the difficulty juries have in grappling
with the complex factual testimony in medical malpractice cases.
the Second Department affirmed a verIn Tiernan v. Hein~en,~'
dict for the plaintiff in a breast cancer malpractice case, but re-

48. See id.
49. See id. a t 231, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t 777.
50. See id. a t 232, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t 777.
51. See id.
52. See id. a t 232, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t 777-78. Justice Maim opined:
In this case, plaintiff did not become aware of any problem with the fetus for sovera1 weeks after the alleged negligence of defendant. Thus, there was no contemporaneous observation or instantaneous awareness of injury or death and, even if tho
other elements of the Bovsun rule were satisfied, the failure on this aspect prevents
plaintiff from recovery thereunder. A more expansive interpretation of "contemporaneous observation" should come not from us, but from the Court of Appeals.

Id.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. a t 233, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t 778.
109 A.D.2d 783,486 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep't 1985).
For more information, see N.Y. JUD. LAW3 148(a) (McKinney 1983).
See id.

104 A.D.2d 645, 480 N.Y.S.2d 24 (2d Dep't 1984).
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duced as extremely excessive a jury verdict of $1.5 millionP8 Of
interest is Justice Titone's dissent in which he pointed out that the
jury's verdict as to the several defendants was inconsistent and unsupported by the record.6B
What must have been an even more dficult case for the trial
. ~ ~Second Department, afcourt was Mertsaris v. 73rd C ~ r p The
firming in part and reversing in part, ordered a new trial in a medical malpractice setting where the plaintiffs had alleged that sequential acts of professional negligence resulted in the birth of a
baby with permanent, disabling athetoid cerebral palsy?' The
court provided clear guidelines for the new trial to prevent the
problems encountered on appeal.e2Considering, however, that a $7
million verdict was reached at the first trial, it is doubtful if the
defendants will actually accept a second trial.es Justice O'Connor's
opinion, well-written and convincing, is an excellent depiction of
the evidentiary quagmire of a major medical malpractice action.

A. General
The line between a cause of action properly denominated as
negligent supervision of a child, and negligence as to the child, is
the subject of many motions each year. New York law rejects the
~
former concept while recognizing the latter as a c t i ~ n a b l e .In
Malin v. Malin,s6 Justice Fudeman denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. The infant plaintiff was injured by an unattended family car.0e The defendant mother tried to invoke
Holodook v. Spencer,s7 which prohibits actions based on alleged

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See id. a t 648,480 N.Y.S.2d a t 26.
See id. a t 648, 480 N.Y.S.2d a t 27 (Titone, J., dissenting).

105 kD.2d 67, 482 N.Y.S.2d 792 (2d Depst 1984).

See id. a t 69-73, 482 N.Y.S.2d a t 79496.
See id. a t 88, 482 N.Y.S.2d a t 806.
See id. a t 69, 482 N.Y.S.2d a t 794.
64. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35,50,324 N.E.2d 338,346,364 N.YS.2d 859,

871 (1974).
65. 124 Misc 2d 1078,478 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sup. Ct, Erie Co. 1984).
66. See id.
67. 36 N.Y.2d 35,324 N.E.2d 338,364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). In Holodook, a four-yearold jumped out between two parked cars and was struck by the defendant's vehicle. The
infant, by his father, sued the defendant for personal injuries. The defendant then brought
a third-party action against the infant's mother for negligently failing to perform her paren-
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breaches of a standard of conduct peculiarly associated with childrearing.6s The Erie County juries found that "[tlhe duty of the defendant to park carefully was owed to the world at large; and derived from the parties' relation as driver and pedestrian. The fact
that the parties were mother and son was irrelevant to both the
duty and a determination of its breach."6DNew York law has consistently refused to find a cause of action based on what would be,
in essence, negligent parenting.?O While the doctrine of intrafamilial immunity, with regard to actions brought against parents by minors has been modified, it has not been ab~lished.~'
Although the existence and nature of physical harm is generally a question of fact for the jury, an issue of law may arise when
a plaintiff seeks damages outside the scope of New York's so-called
No-Fault Law.72 In Bader v. S ~ n t a n a , ' ~the Fourth Department
reversed a $60,000 award for the plaintiff finding, as a matter of
law, that he had not sustained a serious injury (as statutorily required) to permit recovery in a tort action.74 Although plaintiff
Bader undoubtedly, in the view of the court, sustained a painful
injury, it was not a serious injury entitling the plaintiff to a jury
determinati~n.?~
While the trend in the law of damages in New York has recently seen many appellate remittiturs, a case decided by the
Fourth Department reflects judicial wisdom and compassion in restoring a jury verdict of $500,000 after the trial court ordered a
new trial unless the plaintiff accepted $30,000.76 In Bartolone v.
Jecko~ich,'~
the plaintiff, a middle-aged carpenter and physical fit-

tal duty to provide for the proper care, maintenance and supervision of the child. Tho Court
dismissed the claim, finding that New York would not recognize a third-party action basod
on negligent parental supervision.
68. See Malin, 124 Misc. 2d a t 1079, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 1012.
69. Id.
70. See Holodook, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859. Although tho
Holodook Court held that actions based upon negligent parental supervision are not maintainable, the Court did note that actions maintainable apart from the family relation would
not be withheld because the parties were parent and child. See id. at 50,324 N.E.2d at 346,
364 N.Y.S.2d a t 871.
71. See id.
72. N.Y. INS.LAW5 5221 (McKinney 1985).
73. 106 A.D.2d 858, 483 N.Y.S.2d 143 (4th Dep't 1984).
74. See N.Y. INS.LAW3 5221 (McKinney 1985).
75. See Bader, 106 A.D.2d a t 859, 483 N.Y.S.2d a t 144.
76. See Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 103 A.D.2d 632,481 N.Y.S.2d 545 (4th Dep't 1984).
77. 103 A.D.2d 632, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545 (4th Dep't 1984).
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ness enthusiast, sustained minor injuries in a car collision caused
Following the accident, the plainby the defendants' negligen~e.?~
tiff became psychotic and dysfunctional, a condition described by
The trial court ordered a new
his expert witness as irrever~ible.~~
trial unless the plaintiff accepted $30,000, based on its determination "that there was no basis on which the jury could conclude that
plaintiffs total mental breakdown could be attributed to a minor
accident."80 Such an order was illogical for, if the trial court so believed, it was obligated to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict, not to offer a compromise.
The appellate court found ample proof in the record to support the jury's verdict.81 Although the plaintiff, not surprisingly,
had a past history of mental problems, "[tlhe circumstances of
[the] case before us illustrate[s] the truth of the old axiom that a
defendant must take a plaintiff as he finds him and hence may be
held liabli in damages for aggravation of a pre-existing illness."s2
Although the appellate court restated a long-accepted principle, the generally greater acceptance of psychiatry and the increased availability of therapy indicate that defenses based on the
existence of a previously diagnosed mental condition mill be more
common. Plaintiffs' counsel and judges share a responsibility to insure that a prior history of mental disease does not serve to wipe
out claims for aggravated harm initiated by a negligent defendant's
actions.
Proximate cause remains a diicult concept for definition and
application. In a negligence case based on an alleged violation of a
statute, Dowling v. Consolidated Carriers C0rp.,8~the First Department explored the proximate cause problem. In reversing the
dismissal of an injured truck passenger's complaint, the appellate
court noted that the trial court had misrelied on an inapposite
case.84 Citing the opinion of Mr. Justice Hopkins, one of the greatest jurists in recent New York history, the appellate panel in Dowling found a close relationship between the defendant's violation of

78. See id. at 632,481 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
79. See id. at 633,481 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
80. Id. at 634, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
81. See id. at 635,481 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
82. Id. (citing Malahill v. New York Tramp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 223-24 (1911)).
83. 103 A.D.2d 675,478 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1st Dep't 1984), a f d , 65 N.Y.2d 799,482 NE2d
912, 493 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1985).
84. See id. at 677,478 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
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a statute and the subsequent incident which resulted in harm to
the lai in tiff.^^ The discussion of foreseeability in Dowling is
excellent.
New York courts have resisted attempts to weaken Worker's
Compensation as the main, and generally exclusive, remedys0 of
the injured employees. Each year attempts are made to breach the
barrier of the exclusive remedy. In Bardere v. Zafir,87 the First Department affirmed the dismissal of an injured employee's claim in
tort against his employer. The plaintiff tried to bring his cause of
action within the scope of intentional torts, an area outside the
purview of Worker's Compensation, by showing that the employer
had modified a machine, knowing that it would be hazardous to
employee^.^^ Justice Fein analyzed the plaintiffs claim and found
that he was essentially pleading gross negligence rather than intentional tort.sB The remedy for gross negligence is Worker's
Compensation.
Tort litigation against landlords is increasingly common, with
new theories of duty being propounded each year. One such theory
was rejected by Justice Tenney in Onondaga County in GeorgiO Georgianna, the plaintiffs infant son was bitanna v. G i z ~ y . ~In
ten by a dog which had previously bitten another person.D1The
special twist to this case was the plaintiffs contention that in the
absence of actual knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities,
which the defendant admittedly lacked, constructive knowledge
was sufficient to find liability.92 Constructive knowledge in this instance, according to the plaintiff, was a report filed with the local

85. See id. Justice Hopkins, sitting on the Second Department bench, commented that,
"the definition of proximate cause has been elusive, probably because the public policy un.
derlying the concept cannot be described other than in general terms." Pagan v. Goldborgor,
51 A.D.2d 508,509,382 N.Y.S.2d 549,551 (1976). Most law students would agree with Jus.
tice Hopkins.
86. See N.Y. WORK.
COMP.LAW5 11 (McKinney 1985).
87. 102 A.D.2d 422,477 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1st Dep't), aff'd,63 N.Y.2d 850,472 N.E.2d 37,
482 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1984).
88. See id. a t 423, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t 133.
89. See id. a t 424, 477 N.Y.S.2d a t 134.
90. 126 Misc. 2d 766, 483 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 1984).
91. See id. a t 766, 483 N.Y.S.2d a t 893. One reason why many landlords do not want
their tenants to harbor dogs is that the landlords may be liable if a dog known to them to bo
vicious bites someone. See id. (citing Zwinge v. Love, 37 A.D.2d 874,325 N.YaS.2d 107 (3d
Dep't 1971)).
92. See id.
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town and county of the previous biting incident.O3 The court rejected this theory finding that the defendant landlord had no duty
to search for governmental reports and documents, noting that
"[sluch a burden would be oppressive and unreasonable."*
A Second Department case featured a strong "pro-dog" dissenting opinion by Justice Mangano.B5The alleged culprit in this
rear-end auto collision was the defendant's nine-year old, twentyfive pound Scotch terrier. A jury verdict in favor of the defendant
was reversed by the appellate majority.Be The jury had accepted
the defendant's evidence that the dog, who had "never budged" in
the past, jumped off the seat and onto the gas pedal, thus dislodging the defendant's foot from the brake.B7As the dissent noted, the
majority found that, as a matter of law, the defendant was negligent.98Justice Mangano found that the cases relied on by the majority for finding a matter-of-law liability were inapposite to the
unique facts in Conyer u. Vinti.BBJustice Mangano viewed the reversal of the jury's verdict as "an affront to that particular species
of the animal kingdom, i.e., the tame dog 'which the law, guided by
experience, has always regarded as the friend and companion of
man.' "'00

B. State and Municipal Entities
An area of concern for law enforcement officers nationwide are
lawsuits based on injuries sustained during the "hot pursuit" of
actual or suspected offenders. Two such cases were before the
Third Department during the Survey year.lO' In Rightmeyer v.
State,lo2the plaintiff was fleeing a state trooper who sought to

93. See id.
94. Id. a t 767, 483 N.Y.S.2d a t 894.
95. See Conyers v. Vinti, 107 A.D.2d 787,484 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dep't 1985) (himgmo.
J., dissenting).
96. See id..at 789, 484 N.Y.S.2d a t 622.
97. See id. at 788,484 N.Y.S.2d a t 621.
98. See id. at 790, 484 N.Y.S.2d a t 623.
99. See id. The majority relied on cases in which the defendant hnd acted &matively
with the collision occurring subsequently. See, e.g., Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361,320
N.E.2d 853,362 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1974). In Conyers the defendant was acted upon by her dog.
100. Conyers, 107 kD.2d a t 790, 484 N.Y.S.2d a t 623 (citing Kennett v. Smnitz, 260
kD.2d 759, 761,23 N.Y.S.2d 961, 962 (1940). alf'd, 286 N.Y. 623,36 N.E2d 459 (1941).
101. See Rightmeyer v. State, 108 A.D.2d 1047, 486 N.Y.S.2d 99 (3d Dep't 1985);
Mitchell v. State, 108 A.D.2d 1033, 486 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3d Dep't 1985).
102. 108 A.D.2d 1047,486 N.Y.S.2d 99 (3d Dep't 1085).
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question him after observing that the plaintiffs vehicle inspection
sticker had expired.lo3The trooper was using his siren and emergency lights. The plaintips car collided with a tree as he tried to
evade the trooper and the plaintiff incurred severe injuries.'04 The
Third Department affirmed the Court of Claims' summary judgment in favor of the State.lo6
In Mitchell v. State,lo6 the plaintiff collided with a reckless
driver who was being pursued by a state trooper.lo7 Unlike the
facts in Rightmyer, the trooper in Mitchell was in violation of departmental regulation~as he was not using his siren and emergency lights during the pursuit.'08 The Court of Claims, however,
found that the failure of the trooper to follow proper procedures
was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.'OO The Third
Department affirmed the Court of Claims' dismissal of the claim."0
Tort actions sounding in assault and battery against police officers, and their respective governments, by persons arrested for
crimes are increasingly common. Arnold v. Statell' involved injuries largely caused by a pre-existing, but not obvious, physical condition when the plaintiff was wrestled to the ground by state
troopers.l12 The troopers had a warrant for the subject's arrest,
and according to the troopers, he refused to go with themeu3The
troopers had also received reports that Arnold had weapons on or
near him.l14 The Court of Claims dismissed the plaintiffs claim
and the Third Department affirmed."6
Presiding Justice Mahoney's dissent is disturbing because he,
in effect, attempted to second guess the officers' decision to use
force without bringing to light any relevant facts not considered by

103. See id. at 1047, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
104. See id. at 1048, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
105. See id. a t 1047, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
106. 108 A.D.2d 1033, 486 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3d Dep't 1985).
107. See id. at 1033, 486 N.Y.S.2d a t 98.
108. See id. at 1034,486 N.Y.S.2d a t 99.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. 108 A.D.2d 1021, 486 N.Y.S.2d 94 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 65 N.Y.2d 722,
481 N.E.2d 569, 492 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1985).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1022, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
114. See id. a t 1023, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
115. See id.
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the majority.lle That the plaintiff was being arrested for an offense
that was "nonviolent and relatively minorwn7 is only one factor
which the arresting officers were confronted with a t the sceneF8
The dissent emphasizes the seriousness of the injury, produced because of a pre-existing condition, and ignores the effect of the report of firearms.l19 Justice Mahoney would have the police engage
in excessive and impracticable hair-splitting which might well increase the likelihood of serious violence a t an arrest scene.120
The Third Department also upheld a Court of Claims award
of $75,000 to a former prison inmate who suffered permanent injuries to his left arm when his arm became ensnared in a "bread
proofing" machine.121 Based on the plaintiff's impaired earning
ability, the appellate court found that the amount awarded mas not
excessive.122
In an action against the State of New York under New York's
strict liability labor statute concerning s~afTolding,'*~
the Second
Department upheld an award of $525,000 on behalf of the claim-

116. See id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
117. See id. a t 1024,486 N.Y.S.2d a t 96.
118. See id. a t 1025,486 N.Y.S.2d a t 97. Adjunct Professor of Criminnl Justice, Donnld
Singer of Mercy College, was interviewed in connection with the d p i s of this case.
Singer, an attorney, is Chief of the Greenburgh (N.Y.) Police Department nnd he is a highly
regarded authority on modem police practices. Singer stated:
The decision to physically restrain an uncooperative subject must be mnde with
little time for reflection. Generally, restraint does not result in nny real injuy to
anyone. While the knowledge that a subject is suspected of a violent or serious
crime serves to put arresting officers on their guard, the fact thnt a wnrrant is k i n g
executed for a minor crime must not lull the officer into insecurity. h b y officers
05emes. The bottom line
have been hurt or even killed making arrest. for "minorDD
is that you never know for sure what the subject of the arrest is thinking. Sometimes people accused of relatively minor offenses, people who do not hnve criminnl
records, become berserk when faced with arrest. We see thnt all the time nith driving whiie intoxicated arrests. Professional police officers have a legnl nnd morn1 obligation not to use excessive force, but they also have the right to be os sofe os o
police officer making an arrest can be. And that requires mnking quick decisions
Interview with Donald Singer, Chief of Police, Greenburgh, New York @ec 5,1985) (notes
on file with author).
119. See Arnold, 108 A.D.2d a t 1024-25, 486 N.Y.S.2d nt 96-97 @fahoney, J.,
dissenting).
120. See id.
121. See Georgiadis v. State, 106 A.D.2d 706, 708, 483 N.YS.2d 153, 755 (4th Dep't
1984).
122. See id. a t 709,483 N.Y.S.2d a t 756.
123. N.Y. LAa LAW5 240 (McKinney 1965).
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ant.124The court found that even though another statute required
a safety rail only when the scaffolding was more than twenty feet
high, a proper regard for safety could require a rail on lower scaff01ding.l~~
The plaintiff was working on a state-owned bridge at the
time of
IV. STRICT
LIABILITY

A. Products Liability

7

No doctrinally significant products liability decisions were
handed down during the Survey year. However, several cases are
worthy of brief notice.
Perhaps the most interesting products liability case of the
l~~
husband
Survey year is Cooley v. Carter- Wallace, I ~ 2 c . Plaintiffs
and wife brought this action after the husband was painfully and
permanently injured by a depilatory cream applied to his genital
area.128Cooley applied the cream on the recommendation of a physician prior to a vasectomy procedure.lZ9 The plaintiffs action alleged inadequacy of the product warning, not its absence. Justice
Tenney, sitting in the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, granted
summary judgment on the motion of the defendant manufacturer.
Justice Tenney, in effect, found that the warning on the product,
"Nair," was adequate as a matter of law.130 Justice Tenney's judicial superiors a t the Fourth Department disagreed and reversed.131
Inadequate warning actions are among the most difficult in the
defective products cosmos. As the appellate court in Cooley noted,
"[ulnlike the often highly technical design or manufacturing defect
cases, warning cases usually center on a factual determination of
whether an adequate warning was given."132 While it might seem
from the foregoing words of the court that such cases are in fact

124. See Kalofonos v. State, 104 A.D.2d 75,481 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2d Dep't 1984).
125. See id. a t 80, 481 N.Y.S.2d a t 419.
126. See id. a t 76, 481 N.Y.S.2d a t 416.
127. 102 A.D.2d 642, 478 N.Y.S.2d 375 (4th Dep't 1984).
128. See id. a t 643, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 376.
129. See id.
130. See id. a t 648, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 379.
131. See id. a t 649, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 380.
132. Id. a t 644,478 N.Y.S.2d a t 376. The Cooley court noted that there must first bo a
duty to warn, which is determined by balancing the seriousness of the potential hnrm to the
consumer against the cost to the manufacturer. See id. Once a warning is given, tho focus is
on the adequacy of the warning. See id.
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easier than their counterparts, the design and manufacture cases,
this is not so. The import of words, their effect on the consumer,
their susceptibility to misinterpretation, the balance of the duty to
warn against the manufacturer's not unreasonable reluctance to
alarm unduly-these
and other factors must be carefully
considered.
In Cooley, the warning on the product package specifically
cautioned against applying the product to genital areas.lS3 However, the appellate court noted that the warning, while directing
that the product not be used in the genital area, did not indicate
the seriousness of harm which such use could occasion.1s' Only irritation or allergic reaction were indicated, while plaintiff Cooley
suffered massive harm.lS6 In addition, the warning was located
close to the directions on the package. Such location minimized, to
a certain degree, the impact of the warning.'s6 It is beyond the
scope of this article to analyze whether the warning on the particular product was adequate. It is clear, however, that it cannot be
viewed as adequate as a matter of law and that submission to a
jury is the only proper route.lS7
-

133. See id. a t 643, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 376. The warning read m follow
WARNING: IRRITATION OR ALLERGIC REACTION h W OCCUR FViTH
SOME PEOPLE, EVEN AFTER PRIOR USE WITHOUT ADVERSE EFFECT.
THEREFORE, TEST BEFORE EACH USE BY APPLYING NAIR ON A SMALL
PART OF THE AREA WHERE HAIR IS TO BE REMOVED. FOLLOW DIRECTIONS AND WAIT 24 HOURS. IF SKIN APPEARS NORhlAL, PROCEED. DO
NOT USE ON IRRITATED, INFLAMED, OR BROKEN SKIN. KEEP AWAY
FROM EYES. SHOULD NAIR TOUCH THE EYES, WASH THOROUGHLY
WITH LUKEWARM WATER. RINSE WITH BORIC ACID SOLUTION AND IF
IRRITATION OCCURS, CONSULT YOUR PHYSICIAN. KEEP OUT OF
REACH OF CHILDREN. NAIR LOTION CAN BE USED ON LEGS, ARMS,
FACE, ANYWHERE EXCEPT.. .EYES, NOSE, EARS OR ON BREAST NIPPLES, PERIANAL [sic] OR VAGINNAWGENITAL AREAS.

Id.
134. See id. a t 648,478 N.Y.S.2d a t 379.
135. See id. a t 643,478 N.Y.S.2d a t 376.
136. See id. a t 649,478 N.Y.S.2d a t 379-80.
137. See id. a t 648,478 N.Y.S.2d a t 379;see also supra note 133.The warning indicates
a low threshoId of potential harm to a limited number of users. The warning does of course,
specifically deny that the product is suitable for, or should be used in the genital region.
The plaintiff victim relied on the recommendation of his physician and the ph>&5an mny or
may not have been acting reasonably in making the recommendation. While phpicinns
often recommend products for uses diierent than those for which they arc advertised, the
clear language on the Nair package suggests that the physician may hnve been negligent. A
finder of fact may well find that the warning on the Nair package wm adequate and thnt the
defendant manufacturer should not be strictly liable in tort because n phpician gave a pn-
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A second warning case, in this instance a diversity action, was
Berg v. Underwood's Hair Adaption Process, I ~ CThe
, ' plaintiffs,
~~
who sustained harm when a medical doctor implanted synthetic
fibers into their scalps as part of a baldness treatment, sought to
recover from the manufacturers of the fibers.139 The fibers were
manufactured for non-medical purposes and were distributed as
such. The plaintiffs claimed, however, that the fiber manufacturer
knew of the medical application of their product and failed to warn
potential victims of possible side effects. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the fiber manufacturer.140
Correctly interpreting New York law, the federal bench declined to
find any duty to warn under these circumstances. The court
opined:
Plaintiffs were injured by a bizarre and deliberate abuse by a licensed medical practitioner of a non-medical commercial product.
we do not believe
In light of the wide availability of the fibers
a New York court would impose liability on these appellees. The
duty to guard against a potential misuse of a product does not
extend this far."I

. ..

It is important to note that the manufacturer did not promote

tient overriding advice. To hold a warning to be adequate as a matter of law will dony an
injured plaintiff the right to have a jury examine the impact of the warning from tho consumers' viewpoint. Judges are often less able to assess the product which is the subject of
litigation in its "real world" environment than a jury.
Justice Moule expressed concern that the plaintiff read the warning and becamo concerned. He also noted that to require a manufacturer to cite every possible harm "would
pose an unreasonable burden on manufacturers." 102 A.D.2d a t 650, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 380
(Moule. J., dissenting). Not discussed, but a major argument, for allowing the case to proceed before a jury is the question of whether the defendant was aware that its product was
being recommended by physicians for pre-operative hair removal. Such knowledge might
well be seen by the jury as leading to a requirement for a stronger or more directed warning.
The cost of such a warning, as balanced against the harm sought to be prevented, is
minimal.
138. 751 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1984).
139. See id.
140. See id. a t 137.
141. Id. Berg may be usefully contrasted with Cooley. See supra notes 127-37 and accomparying text. The product in Cooley, Nair, was manufactured for direct application to
the bvdy, and with the defendant-manufacturer's full knowledge that some poople oxporienced side effects with its use. The defendant manufacturer in Berg supplied its product for
use in hairpieces and wigs. To hold the defendant liable because a doctor decided to adapt
its product is clearly unreasonable.
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its product for medical use.142Where a manufacturer does so promote a product, the duty to warn may well be found to exist even
where the application is a striking, even bizarre, departure from
accepted medical procedure.
While the majority of product liability scenarios do not disclose moral, as opposed to legal, culpability on the part of the defendant, Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co.,lJS decided by the
Third Department, does. The majority permitted the maintenance
of a common law fraud cause of action where the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant not only manufactured a defective and dangerous product, but willfully withheld material facts from consumers
while lying to the Consumer Product Safety Com~nission."~Plaintiff"~
husband was killed in an explosion caused by an allegedly
defective propane gas water heater control valvePO
Although punitive damages could not be recovered in
the availability of a fraud cause of action increases the
likelihood that punitive damages will be awarded in certain products liability actions. A finding of fraud also has potentially serious
ramifications for a defendant, and thus it is a cause of action that,
in limited and appropriate circumstances, may advance the policy
objectives of products liability law.

B. Dram Shop
With the campaign against drunken driving intensifying, the
application of the Dram Shop ActxJ7becomes an even more u s e N
tool than it has been in the past. Vendors of intoxicating spirits
continually seek to limit their liability under the Act.
In Smith v. G ~ l i , 'the
~ ~ Fourth Department applied the existing principle that Dram Shop Act liability for compensatory
damages can be spread among multiple tortfeasors through contri-

142. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
143. 104 A.D.2d 84,481 N.Y.S.2d 891 (3d Dep't 1984).
144. See id. at 85,481 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 88, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 895. "Because at the time of decendent's death
herein punitive damages were unavailable in a wrongful death action, it n e c d y follo~;e
that such damages are inaccessible to the widow." Id. Punitive damages nre now recovernble
in New York wrongful death actions.
LAW 33 11-100,ll-101 (hIcKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986).
147. N.Y GEN. OBLIG.
148. 106 A.D.2d 120,484 N.Y.S.2d 740 (4th Dep't 1985).
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bution.14@While the Fourth Department's analysis is dictated by
statute and precedent,lS0I wonder if the goals of the Dram Shop
Act might not be met more effectively if contribution was denied.
In all likelihood, this would require an amendment of the statute.
In another opinion from the Fourth Department, Bartlelett v.
Grande,161the court rejected a vendor's attempt to secure contribution from a deceased vendee's estate.lS2"To permit the vendors
to seek contribution from the estate of the vendee when it is the
vendee's dependents who are seeking recovery, would diminish the
plaintiffs' potential recovery and allow the vendor to reduce liabilThe Fourth Department recognized that such
ity s~bstantially."'~~
a step would frustrate an important public policy.lG4

A. Privacy and Publicity
In the absence of a common law right of privacy, most litigation in New York State alleging what amounts to tortious invasion
of privacy is brought under section 51 of the Civil Rights Law,loo
around which a considerable body of case law has developed. The
most significant section 51 case of the Survey year is Stephano v.
News Group Publications, ~ n c . , ~ ~ h a n i m o decided
u s l ~ by the
Court of Appeals. The plaintiff, working as a professional model,
posed for several photographs in which he modeled a new jacket
for men. He alleged that he agreed to commercial use of the photograph for one advertisement only.lb7The photographs were subse-

149. See id. a t 122,484 N.Y.S.2d a t 742 (citing N.Y. CPLR 1401; Wood v. City of Now
York, 39 A.D.2d 534,330 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1st Dep't 1972); Anderson v. Comnrdo, 107 Misc. 2d
821,436 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Sup. C t , Livingston Co. 1981)). Exemplary damages nwnrded pursuant to the Dram Shop Act are not, however, subject to contribution. See Smith, 106 A.D.2d
a t 122, 484 N.Y.S.2d a t 742 (citing Mitchell v. The Shoals, Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 381, 264
N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 338, 227 N.E.2d 21, 280 N.Y.S.2d
113 (1967)).
150. See N.Y. CPLR 1401 (McKinney 1976);Wood v. City of New York, 39 A.D.2d 634,
330 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1972); Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 383 (1972).
151. 103 A.D.2d 671, 481 N.Y.S.2d 566 (4th Dep't 1984).
152. See id. a t 672, 481 N.Y.S.2d a t 566.
153. See id. a t 672, 481 N.Y.S.2d a t 567.
154. See id. a t 673,481 N.Y.S.2d a t 567.
155. N.Y. CN. RIGHTSLAW8 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1986).
156. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984).
157. See id. a t 180, 474 N.E.2d a t 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d a t 221.
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quently published in several issues of New York magazine in what
can be described as consumer news columns. Price and availability
of the modeled jacket were given, but no advertiser paid for the
feature.lS8
The plaintiff brought a section 51 claim. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment while the
appellate division reversed.1s9 The state's highest court reversed
the appellate division.lBOPart of the plaintWs claim hinged upon
his contention that the defendant sought additional or new advertising revenue through use of the column which featured photos of
him.161 The Court of Appeals rejected this theory. The Court
noted:
The newsworthiness exception [to section 511 applies not only to
reports of political happenings and social trends
but also to
news stories and articles of consumer interest including develop[Tlhe event or matter of public
ments in the fashion world
interest which the defendant seeks to convey is not the model's
performance, but the availability of the clothing items
displayed.ls2

.. .

...

The Court of Appeals provides a good discussion of the contemporary policy purposes of section 51 in Stephano. Perhaps because of the absence of a common law remedy for invasion of privacy, section 51 has acquired a degree of creative interest i t would
otherwise lack. The Court of Appeals has been sensitive to
preventing inroads which, by classifying activity as commercial and
for purposes of trade and advertising, would threaten first amendment rights and propel section 51 litigation into the Supreme
Court.

158. See id. a t 179,474 N.E.2d at 582,485 N.Y.S.2d a t 220-21.
159. See id. at 187,474 N.E.2d at 586,485 N.Y.S.2d a t 227.
160. See id. a t 185,474 N.E.2d at 583, 485 N.Y.S.2d a t 225.
161. See id.
162. Id. a t 184,474 N.E.2d a t 582-83.485 N.Y.S.2d a t 225. The Court nlso noted:
The fact that the defendant may have included this item in its columns solely or
primarily to increase the circulation of its magazine and therefore its profits
does not mean that the defendant has used the plaintill's picture for trade purposes
within the meaning of the statute. Indeed, most publications seek to increme their
circulation and also their profits. It is the content of the article and not the defend- ant's motive or primary motive to increase circulation which determines whether it
is a newsworthy item, as opposed to a trade usage, under the Civil Rights Law.
Id. a t 184-85,474 N.E.2d a t 585,485 N.Y.S.2d a t 225.

...
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The First Department, in Caesar u. Chemical Bank,lo3 affirmed the trial court determination which certified as a class bank
employees who alleged commercial unauthorized use of their photographs by the defendant bank.ls4 The court also affirmed, somewhat reluctantly, the longstanding mandate of section 51 that consent must be in writing and that oral consent goes only to the
matter of damages but not to 1iability.le6The majority invited legislative intervention to permit oral consent,1oewhile the dissenting
justices found the requirement for a written consent to be a bolster
for a "technically meaningless claim."ls7 The dissent argued that
the fact that the pictures were posed indicates consent.loe This
makes no sense since the stated reason for photographing employees may have nothing to do with the eventual use to which the
photos are put.
The interrelationship of the federal Constitution and section
51 is well illustrated in Lerman u. Flynt Distributing Co.loDThe
plaintiff in Lerman brought her action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York after learning
that she had been incorrectly identified in defendant's publication
as having appeared nude in a movie role.170 The publication featured photos of a nude actress, allegedly, but not actually, the
plaintiff.171 The plaintiff had never appeared nude in a film.17a
In the district court, the plaintiff secured an award of ten million dollars.17s The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.174
While sympathy for the plaintiff is not hard to find, the appellate
court correctly analyzed section 51 law and found that the plaintiff
was not able to successfully maintain her claim. The federal appeals court found that the article in question was not an advertisement but a story about a matter of some, if not general, public

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

106 A.D.2d 353, 483 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 1984).
See id.
See id. at 353, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18.
See id.
See id. at 353, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
See id. at 354, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984).
See id. at 127.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 128.
See id. at 142.
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interest.176The plaintifPs strongest claim to section 51 protection
rested under an interpretation of that statute whereby even a news
article may result in liability if the person depicted without consent bore no reasonable relationship to the subject of the arti~1e.l'~
Here the plaintiff was the author of both the book and the screen
script of the movie which was the subject of the arti~1e.l'~
She was,
within the meaning of the first amendment, a limited purpose public figure and, as such, she failed to meet the substantially higher
burden placed on such figures in order for them to prevail in actions against media defendants.17s
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals made a regrettable observation, which is extraneous to the issues decided and is probably incorrect:
Finally, we note that reputational damage to Ms. Lerman could
not have been great. Only the readers of Adelina, a magazine of
relatively modest circulation that Ms. Lerman describes as "sordid" and "obscene" would have seen the offending material. In
fact, given the number of famous persons portrayed in this fashion, one wonders whether such pictures are even capable of producing genuine reputational harm.170
Whether such pictures produce harm depends on many factors, all
of which are, in a properly alleged and valid action, questions for
the finder of fact. It is unlikely that any of the justices of the appellate court would be amused to be misidentified in nude photos
in Adelina. Of equal importance is the established concept that
harm to reputational interests may not be manifested for some
time after publication. Premature pronouncements by jurists on
the possibility of harm are unrealistic and unfair. Finally, section
51 does not require reputational harm. Indeed, case law reflects
many instances where reputations may have been enhanced by unlawful misappropriation of a person's likeness. Reputational harm
is relevant to damages, but not to liability.
The lack of a reasonable relationship between the illustrations
used in a news article and the alleged identified subjects in the
illustration as a basis for section 51 liability was highlighted in

175. See id. at 130.
176. See id. at 137.
177. See id. at 132.
178. See id. at 142.
179. Id. at 141.
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Quezada by De Lamota u. Daily News.180 The infant plaintiffs
were, allegedly, identifiable in a drawing which accompanied a
news story on juvenile drug use.18' There was no issue that the
plaintiffs were not meant to be implicated in drug trafficking. The
artist supposedly used a photograph of the juveniles in executing
the commissioned drawing.le2 The court, in denying that part of
the defendant's summary judgment motion which sought to eliminate the section 51 cause of action, noted that the issue of whether
the plaintiffs could be identified from the drawing was one of
fact.18=However, if they were identifiable, their admitted lack of
association with the subject of the article would result in
liability.'84
The continuing lesson of cases such as Quezada is that the
media must use the utmost care in utilizing photographs and drawings as illustrations for what are clearly news articles. An increasing number of section 51 cases focus on this area of liability, where
past case law focused mostly on advertisements.
B. Libel and Slander
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the First Department in Gaeta v. New York News, Inc.,IBs.thus dismissing a libel
action brought by the former wife of a patient in a state mental
health facility. The defendant newspaper had investigated conditions in the state mental health system and reported its conclusions in a series of articles.le6An article detailed the experiences of
the plaintiff and stated that she allegedly had affairs during her
marriage to the patient, her infidelity supposedly contributing to
his mental problems.187
Judge Kaye, writing for a unanimous court, noted that "[tlhis
libel action, brought by a nonpublic figure against a newspaper
publisher and reporter, tests the reach of Chapadeau u. Utica Ob-

180. 125 Misc. 2d 302, 479 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1984).
181. See id. at 302, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
182. See id. at 302-03, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. 62 N.Y.2d 340, 465 N.E.2d 802, 477 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1984).
186. See id. at 346,465 N.E.2d at 803,477 N.Y.S.2d at 83. The articles were pnrt of an
investigative reporting project.
187. See id. at 346,465 N.E.2d at 803-04,477 N.Y.S.2d at 83-84.
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server-Di~patch."~~
Chapadeau is a major Court of Appeals decision which holds that a plaintiff in a libel action must demonstrate
gross irresponsibility on the part of the defendant if the article
concerned is a matter of legitimate public concern.18e
The Gaeta p l a i n t s maintained that no such concern could
embrace references to her in a news article and that a simple negligence standard was appropriate for determining liability.leOThe
Court of Appeals disagreed and found that Chapadeau was controlling.lel The state's highest court also found that the plaintiff
had not alleged any conduct on the part of the defendants which
could be construed by a jury as constituting gross irresponsibility
and thus dismissed the action.lB2
There is nothing new in Gaeta, but the Court of Appeals took
the opportunity to clearly re-state the policy and rationale of
Chapadeau, perhaps in the hope of providing guidance in this difficult area.lS3
A former Schenectady mayor witnessed the dismissal of his libel action against a local newspaper in Duci u. Daily Gazette Co.le(
The Third Department reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss.196 A teenaged lifeguard had been
quoted in a news report of a drowning that the Mayor had just
stood around laughing and talking while futile rescue efforts were
undertaken.lS8The appellate court found the former Mayor's com-

188. Id.
189. See 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975). In Chapadeau, the
appellant was arrested and charged with criminal possession of n hypodermic instrument,
and criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree. The respondent's newspaper reported the appellant's arrest, and also stated that the appellant wos part of a group or
party where drugs and beer were present when he was arrested. The nppellant clnimed that
these latter statements libeled h i . The newspaper admitted the f&ity of the lntter statements, but contended that the article, when viewed in its entirety, wos fair and nmuate.
The Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the newspaper, holding that
there needs to be grossly irresponsible conduct for liability. In this case, the Court found
that the newspaper exercised reasonable methods to insure accuracy.
190. See Gaeta, 62 N.Y.2d a t 346,465 N.E.2d a t 803,477 N.YS.2d nt 83.
191. See id. a t 350,465 N.E.2d a t 806,477 N.Y.S.2d a t 86.
192. See id.
193. During the Survey year, the Fit Department considered libel issues involving the
interpretation and application of Chapadeau. See Ortiz v. Valdescnstilln, 102 kD.2d 513,
478 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1st Dep't 1984). While essentially a fact-sensitive aw,the discusion of
the majority in Ortiz usefully compliments Gaeta.
194. 102 A.D.2d 940,477 N.Y.S.2d 760 (3d Dep't 1984).
195. See id. a t 941,477 N.Y.S.2d a t 762.
196. See id. a t 940.477 N.Y.S.2d a t 761.
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plaint defective on two theories. First, he failed to show that the
words quoted, in an article concerning a matter of public concern,
were susceptible of the defamatory meaning which the plaintiff
ascribed to them.le7 Second, since he alleged only one act of supposed defamation against the defendant, he was bound to show
special damages, which he did not do.lD8
"Death is an honorable estate, so that no one is demeaned or
belittled by the report of his or her death."lDOSo noted Justice
Greenfield in dismissing an action brought by a non-dead plaintiff
and his parents.200Plaintiff David Rubinstein saw an obituary notice about himself in both the New York Daily News and the New
York Post, neither of which was aware that he was, in fact, alivee201
He claimed severe physical and emotional trauma and an inability
to work. Not to be outdone, his parents sued for their own psychic
anguish in addition to claiming mutual loss of consortium.202
Justice Greenfield stated that the plaintiffs' action did not
sound in libel, a reality which the plaintiffs themselves acknowledged.203The jurist's well-written opinion briefly reviews the real
basis for asserting this action, a variation on the infliction of
mental distress theme.204The justice's review of New York law led
him to find that merely being incorrectly reported as dead does
not, by itself, fit into any recognized cause of action.200

C. Miscellaneous Intentional Torts
In Moye v. Gary,206 United States District Judge Sweet dismissed a complaint by the pro se plaintiff, who alleged intentional
infliction of mental distress by her supervisor.207Both were federal
employees at the time of the action. Judge Sweet noted that the
conduct of the defendant, even if it had actually occurred, at most

197. See id. at 940,477 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
198. See id. at 941, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
199. Rubinstein v. New York Post Corp., 128 Misc. 2d 1,3,488 N.Y.S.2d 331,332 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Co. 1985).
200. See id. at 6, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
201. See id. at 2, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 3, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
204. See id. at 4-6, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 333-35.
205. See id. at 6, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
206. 595 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
207. See id. at 739.
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constituted insults and indignities which New York law excludes
from the concept of intentional infliction of mental distress.208
A troublesome case involving an allegation of false imprisonment against the State of New York was decided incorrectly by the
Second Department. In Gonzalez v. State,loBthe appellate panel
overturned a Court of Claims judgment for the claimant. The
claimant had been found by a New York City transit police officer
on subway tracks and, after being removed from the tracks, was
taken first to Kings County Hospital and then to Kingsboro, a
state psychiatric facility.210He was held for observation for about
two days before being discharged. The appellate court majority
found that the forced hospitalization was privileged, based upon its
review of the record.211
Justice Mangano, in dissent, acknowledged that the facts in
the record were susceptible to several interpretation^."'^ He asserted, however, that "there was ample evidence in the record to
support the holding of the Court of Claims."21s He also noted the
findings of an admitting psychiatrist who found no evidence of
psychosis on the morning of the subway incident.l14
The willingness of an appellate court to search a trial record in
order to arrive a t a new factual determination favorable to the
State of New York is unfortunate in itself. Even more regretable is
the fact that the appellate court majority reversed a false imprisonment judgment for a plaintiff in an action involving the mental
health system. Even with increased safeguards, both substantive
and procedural, the deck is largely stacked against a person confined for observation. The reports of police officers, the preconceptions of hospital staff, and the reality that such persons often are
not quite in top form are generally factors that combine to sway a
court to find against a claim of false imprisonment. Perhaps this is
inevitable and largely unavoidable. When a court does find, however, that a person had been illegally held, an appellate court
should exercise the greatest reluctance to interfere with that find-

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See id. at 740.
110 A.D.2d 810,488 N.Y.S.2d 231 (2d Dep't 1985).
See id. at 812, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
See id. at 812, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
See id. at 814, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 234 (hlangano, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id.
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ing. Public policy demands that mental health officers understand
the concept of false imprisonment and care about avoiding its commission. Gonzalez does nothing to further that goal.

VI. CONCLUSION
Well-funded advertising campaigns are attempting to convince
the New York public that common law tort remedies are a burden
society cannot afford. Counter-campaigns invoke the image of
greedy insurance companies, incompetent physicians and helpless
consumers who are the victims of the shoddy and the dishonest
and who have only the law of tort to look for recovery of damages.
The rhetoric is extreme and the solutions proposed are often draconian. No system is perfect and some change is not only to be
expected, but to be welcomed. The vitality of the common law and
its ability to adapt to changing circumstances must not be overlooked or hastily rejected because of special interests whether they
be from the plaintiffs' or the defendants' territory. Municipal tort
liability is an even more pressing problem than medical malpractice. Mass disaster tort cases threaten the economic viability of national resources, often with national defense implications.
Whatever the route taken by New York legislatures, both judges
and legal practitioners share a duty to uphold the rich heritage of
the common law.
A number of important state and local government liability
cases are expected to be decided during the coming Survey year.
Judicial scrutiny of damage awards, on the increase over the past
few years, will continue. These and other developments will be analyzed in the next annual Survey article.
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